| 作成者 |
|
|
|
| 本文言語 |
|
| 出版者 |
|
|
|
| 発行日 |
|
| 収録物名 |
|
| 出版タイプ |
|
| アクセス権 |
|
| 関連DOI |
|
| 関連DOI |
|
| 関連URI |
|
| 関連情報 |
|
|
|
| 概要 |
We focus on the formation of International Technology Agreements (ITAs) to solve global environmental issues following the framework of Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010). Their study shows that ITAs can always... improve non-cooperative equilibria because they introduce the rule by which signatories have chance to dissolve the ITA. Without this rule, social welfare may be decreased by introducing ITAs. However we show that, even if signatories do not have chance to dissolve ITA, there is no possibility which ITAs bring lower social welfare by modifying Hoel and de Zeeuw's model so that there is no cooperation in technology adoption. In addition, we investigate the condition under which non-cooperation, compared to cooperation, in technology adoption can bring higher social welfare.続きを見る
|
Mendeley出力
